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Abstract. Distributed decision support systems designed for healthcare use can 
benefit from services and information available across a decentralised environ-
ment. The sophisticated nature of collaboration among involved partners who 
contribute services or sensitive data in this paradigm, however, demands careful 
attention from the beginning of designing such systems. Apart from the tradi-
tional need of secure data transmission across clinical centres, a more important 
issue arises from the need of consensus for access to system-wide resources by 
separately managed user groups from each centre. A primary concern is the de-
termination of interactive tasks that should be made available to authorised us-
ers, and further the clinical resources that can be populated into interactions in 
compliance with user clinical roles and policies. To this end, explicit interaction 
modelling is put forward along with the contextual constraints within interac-
tions that together enforce secure access, the interaction participation being 
governed by system-wide policies and local resource access being governed by 
node-wide policies. Clinical security requirements are comprehensively ana-
lysed, prior to the design and building of our security model. The application of 
the approach results in a Multi-Agent System driven by secure interaction mod-
els. This is illustrated using a prototype of the HealthAgents system. 
Keywords: Clinical Information System, Multi-Agent System, Security Model. 
1   Introduction and Motivation 
In a distributed collaborative healthcare environment, multiple clinical organisations 
from geographically different sites may be involved together in the delivery of health-
care services, each having its own users, resources, and access policies. Clinical users, 
residing in their own sites and doing their specific jobs, often need to access globally 
available resources and services under locally set constraints.  
Such an environment brings challenges to distributed healthcare system infrastruc-
tures, especially when security is a concern. Security concerns, either to a conven-
tional system or a distributed system, spread all over the system and differ from one 
system to another. If they are not taken into account, as early as a system begins to be 
built, the integrity and usability of the system may be critically compromised. Secu-
rity challenges for a distributed healthcare system are notable in several aspects. 
Firstly, no global user repository will be available for distributed authorisation. Clini-
cal centres may join or leave independently. The management and administration of 
resource access will have to be de-centralised in the network, where each site main-
tains their own users and resources to be accessed. Secondly, although access control 168  L. Xiao, P. Lewis, and S. Dasmahapatra 
becomes complicated in a distributed environment, we shall bear in mind that unless 
some degree of open access is promoted where hospitals and users are able to join in 
freely, the system will not be able to improve clinical decision making by using the 
knowledge they share. Thirdly, in such an open access condition, healthcare records 
which contain sensitive private information shall by no means be disclosed, even to 
collaborative centres and friendly clinicians, except for healthcare purposes. Lastly 
and more complicatedly, we shall consider the access constraints not only on individ-
ual cases, but also on what each of them consists of. Can doctors have access to all 
patient records in connected hospitals? Can a pathologist have access to complete 
records or even alter irrelevant reports? 
Generally, securing healthcare information systems should authorise users with 
genuine needs to have access to the services and resource items, in order to perform 
their job responsibilities. Clinical requirements must be carefully studied in order to 
understand the constituents of job responsibilities and build the security model.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses clinical security 
requirements including the principles that need to be supported by the security archi-
tecture under development. Section 3 discusses existing security approaches and de-
scribes their weaknesses in handling the requirements identified. Section 4 gives an 
overview of a layered security model and Section 5 illustrates this and the process of 
building it in detail, using the HealthAgents system. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2   Security Requirements of Healthcare Information Systems 
We shall, in the beginning, draw distinctions between the types of threats imposed to 
healthcare systems and their likelihood. Though eavesdropping or hacking is a major 
concern to computer network security, it is so expensive that dedicated and capable 
intruders may consider using a more convenient way. Actually, 10% of GPs (general 
practitioner) in the UK have experienced their computers being physically stolen [8]. 
More likely, improper use of the system may lead to privacy leaks, by careless (or 
malicious) users, extra privileges given by the system incorrectly. A well-designed 
system should not only protect the communication sites and end users, but also care-
fully authorise users with genuine needs to have access to selective sharing of infor-
mation without exposing additional information under protection. This security need 
has currently not been well addressed in healthcare information systems [4]. In this 
section, we outline the challenges and common security requirements of healthcare 
systems in a distributed environment, where preserving privacy and maintaining 
openness are crucial and information access decisions depend upon role and context.  
2.1   The Distributed Environment of Healthcare Information Systems 
Aggregating dispersed data into large databases is expensive and practically unfeasible, 
since geographically different healthcare centres have to have control over their datasets 
and at the same time maintain a globally consistent data schema. A more important 
reason to oppose data consolidation is concerned with healthcare data confidentiality. In 
the UK, the National Health Service (NHS), driven by the motives of easier central 
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patient record system and give access to extended NHS community. This has been op-
posed [7] [22] for the reason that such a system, collecting data from existing GP sys-
tems but out of their control, is in conflict with the ethical principle that no patient 
should be identifiable other than to the GP without patient consent [5] and the result 
from a survey that most patients are unwilling to share their information with NHS [6]. 
Another objection arises from the overwhelming workload such a centralised system 
could possibly put upon a security officer responsible for managing the data sharing [4]. 
A distributed healthcare service infrastructure, however, implies the capability that 
is required to cope with the administrative burden and the continuous maintenance 
needs arising from fully functional and networked clinical centres, each of which has 
its own users, data, access policies, and which assumes that cross-centre access is the 
norm. A distributed environment and its associated dynamics bring other concerns, 
such as patient privacy preserving, to the information-sharing healthcare network.  
2.2   Preserving Privacy and Confidentiality in Shared Access 
The privacy of patient information is an important issue and failure to recognise this will 
lead to risk of patient safety, loss of public confidence in clinical organisations, and so 
on [23]. A fundamental ethical principle stated by both the EU and the General Medical 
Council in the UK is that, patients must consent to data sharing. The British Medical 
Association [10] advises that clinical professionals, who have access to patient confi-
dential information in order to perform their duties, are responsible for the information 
they hold under ethical or professional obligations of confidentiality and shall not use or 
disclose such information for any purpose other than the clinical care of the patient to 
whom it relates. This means patients shall be assured that they can trust the access of 
their information, by a care team within their treating hospitals or experts involved from 
collaborative centres, if any, is safe and accords with their agreement. The moving from 
a traditional patient-doctor relationship towards a modern patient-healthcare service 
relationship implies trust to clinical systems must be maintained rather than reliance on 
doctor responsibilities. The absence of a mechanism or policy framework in the interest 
of information governance and confidentiality protection, hence, may damage the 
healthcare services aimed to be delivered, since private information of any individual 
patient may be made available by systems to people not directly related with the care of 
that patient. This will give opportunities to potential threats, possibly coming from in-
side workers, as well as outside hackers. Such threats include ungraceful private infor-
mation disclosure and abuse or even more risky, incorrect clinical decisions made for 
vulnerable patients due to clinical data being wrongly altered, accidentally or deliber-
ately. It is worth noting that threats from outside intruding into the network are much 
rarer than from inside. The security risks tend to increase dramatically, therefore, when 
an interconnected clinical system network is in place which makes separately stored 
patient records and clinical information easily accessible and lets a wider range of peo-
ple have access to them. Appropriate access control to patient records is the fundamen-
tal need for patient privacy and information security [23]. 
2.3   Maintaining an Open Access 
Two aspects of openness must be maintained: 1) open for joining the system and not 
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previously unrecognised users) from accessing information available across organisa-
tional boundaries; 2) open for information sharing to the network. Conducting   
healthcare research with more open use of information (identifiable data, etc.) under 
legitimate constraints and user acceptance, though not related with the clinical care 
directly, advances medical knowledge and promotes higher quality of healthcare ser-
vice in the long run and is welcomed by the society. A clinical system can benefit 
most from clinical data as well as patient-specific data if such information can be 
machine-analysed and digested. The knowledge accumulated can be useful for later 
decision makings, particularly for rare but similar cases encountered in the future, 
confidential information contained in cases not being revealed.  
2.4   The Different Access Needs to Data Subsets Due to Distinct Job Nature 
The need of distinguishing only the relevant data for sharing among clinical profes-
sionals rather than the whole records arises from preserving privacy while maintain-
ing open access. Even if name, address and other privacy information is removed to 
produce a seemingly anonymised record, a NHS clinician can easily identify a patient 
by the NHS number and they must be able to do so to perform their jobs. Therefore, it 
is sensible to grant access permission to particular record parts on the basis of users’ 
expertise. This expertise determines their actual needs of access, to the data parts they 
routinely work with and by doing so, healthcare roles fulfilled. For example, pathol-
ogy medical records or reports may be sent to a pathologist involved in a patient’s 
care; prescription sent to a pharmacist; and sensitive parts not sent out at all. A spe-
cialist may have more control over their own partitions, e.g. write their reports or 
order certain tests, but limited permissions to other specialists’ partitions or even not 
at all, e.g. to very sensitive medical test results. 
2.5   The Access Policies and Principles Pertinent to Patients as Individuals 
It is not rational to allow a professional to have access to all patient records, even if 
limited to the data subset fitting his/her expertise. Only relevant clinicians who have 
real life relationships with patients in clinical centres should access their records. This 
is documented in British Medical Association’s security policy principles for clinical 
information systems [7], and the feasibility of adopting it has been evidenced in [23]. 
Two major principles are as follows. 
Principle of Access: “Each identifiable clinical record shall be marked with an access 
control list naming the people or groups of people who may read it and append data to 
it. The system shall prevent anyone not on the access control list from accessing the 
record in any way.”  
Principle of Control: “One of the clinicians on the access control list must be 
marked as being responsible. Only she may alter the access control list, and she may 
only add other health care professionals to it.” 
A named responsible clinician, possibly a patient GP, as in the UK or a primary 
care physician (PCP), as in the US, may set up a workgroup including the specialists 
who together deliver healthcare to the patient. According to the Principle of Access, it 
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 RBAC for files [16], have access to a subset of data they are responsible for, reflect-
ing their job nature. The one who sets up the workgroup will let the system know the 
group members and their roles in the group, in accord with the Principle of Control. 
This implies a data ownership. Such a scheme decentralises management burden and 
increases scalability. The distributed environment and open access requirements sug-
gest that a named doctor may involve specialists from other sites (remote consultants, 
temporary attending physicians, etc.) into healthcare procedures. For example, a 
medical opinion requested on a surgical patient may require a medical registrar, from 
other directorates, to exercise override access to that patient’s notes [23]. This is re-
lated with delegation [4]. Essentially, a responsible doctor grants access to local or 
remote users from trusted sites and occasionally, someone acts on their behalf, imply-
ing ownership transfer. A triangle relationship is described in [15]: a patient is associ-
ated with a workgroup, of which a user is a member, so that a user is permitted access 
via the workgroup to patient (“self-claimed” or “colleague-granted”/delegation). 
3   Existing Security Solutions: Role-Based Access Control and 
Role Mapping in a Distributed Environment 
In Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [16], permissions that describe operations 
upon resources are associated with roles. Users are assigned to roles to gain permis-
sions that allow them to perform particular job functions. Privileges may be calculated 
as follows [2]: 
Privileges = User-Role * Role-Definition + Rules-Function (User-Attributes) 
In addition to the static collection of rights accumulated by roles, a user can dy-
namically achieve extra rights if they expose certain attributes as defined by rules. 
This model is efficient when many users require the same set of rights in an organisa-
tion but otherwise unmanageable or even useless when roles vary in different   
conditions under which users act. In a hospital, roles can be defined for a number of 
classified groups to aggregate permissions, e.g. consultant, radiologist, nurse, who 
have static job functions. However, dynamic contexts exist in role playing, e.g. pa-
tients may be additionally assigned to or removed from a list for which a named doc-
tor is responsible and this influences this doctor’s role in caring these patients. RBAC 
has difficulties to capture such security-relevant contexts as patient, location, and time 
in healthcare environment [4]. Patient-doctor relationship is identified as a critical 
clinical security constraint to record access, described in Section 2. 
The Community Authorisation Service (CAS) [1] provides a solution to the man-
agement of user access control within Virtual Organisations (VOs) spanning over 
multiple sites in the Grid environment. It breaks the tradition of requiring each re-
source provider to maintain the mapping of individual users (across VOs) to its local 
database roles in order to authorise access to its resources. Using CAS, user member-
ships are instead based on VO roles and local resource providers only need to map 
these to local database roles. This dramatically reduces the number of mapping entries 
across resource providers and the duplicated maintenance burden put on them once a 
new user joins or a current user privilege changes. 
Such an approach requires no global user repository. However, a presumption of 
using the approach, as it is in RBAC, is that a large number of users can be grouped 
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For the same reason that RBAC is infeasible to address the clinical requirement 
that information access or travelling may alter from patient to patient and user led as 
stated in the Principle of Access, the CAS is encountered with similar difficulties. 
Suppose clinicians A and B with the same speciality are from hospitals P and Q re-
spectively. They will be categorised into the same VO role and the same access rights 
to data in P and Q. But in reality A shall have more privileges than B to certain data, 
e.g. of patients in P under A’s care, and vice versa for B’s privileges in Q.  
Managing a resource access model is complex where there is a large number and 
various types of users, resource items, and access policies, user responsibilities being 
dynamic and ownership being distributed. The common practice of simply defining 
roles that aggregate all permissions required for the collection of resources to com-
plete tasks is not realistic due to the diversity of individual needs which literally en-
tails each individual a distinct role. Even the burden of defining and maintaining a 
proper set of access control policies based on roles for automating authorisation could 
be considerable. A security solution must be able to cope with the complexity. 
4   Overview of a Layered Security Model  
It has been pointed out that healthcare systems should be designed with multilateral 
security rather than multilevel security [9]. Unlike some military systems prevent 
information flow “down” from top secret to secret then to confidential, healthcare 
systems usually prevent information flow “across” from one clinician to another or 
from one hospital to another. This is evidenced by the requirements outlined in Sec-
tion 2.4 and Section 2.5 where different access needs to cases and case partitions are 
distinguished due to distinct job responsibilities.  
However, we argue a multilevel security model is more manageable, task availabil-
ity being in the top level control and resource availability to tasks in lower level con-
trol. A multilateral security model resides in the lower level and complements the 
multilevel security model. The assignment of tasks to users is a business decision to 
be made by stakeholders, possibly explicitly in rules. It is sensible to regard the acces-
sibility to tasks the organisational privileges with which organisation seniority is   
related and access to business functions restricted. Since tasks already exist in organi-
sations and are routinely performed by specific user groups, they help to functionally 
decompose the system and ease security management. If a user can perform a specific 
type of task, then there must be certain resource items available to him/her to load 
into the task, if not all. Without the context of accomplishing one or more tasks in 
different privilege levels, information access makes no sense. The rational of using a 
combined multilevel and multilateral model is further supported by the fact that a job 
responsibility is determined by the level of authority and the division of work [14]. 
The former prevents information flow downwards and the latter prevents information 
flow across, being concerned about workgroup membership and job speciality under 
our further refinement. This forms a layered security architecture that addresses the 
healthcare security requirements.  
1)  Privilege of performing various types/levels of tasks and executing associated 
interaction models is determined by job title or grade/level. Users may upgrade 
their job titles occasionally and this is managed locally. Semantics of job titles 
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2)  Privilege of loading case instances for performing tasks (or enactment of interac-
tion models) is determined by real life workgroup memberships or job boundary. 
This is managed by the locally named doctors, who shall be flagged as owners in 
case records’ access control lists.  
3)  Privilege of accessing case record partitions (e.g. patient data, biopsy data, microar-
ray data, MRI and MRS data, diagnosis data, therapy data, surgery data, etc.) is de-
termined by job nature or specialist one takes on in hospitals (e.g. oncologist, pa-
thologist, radiologist, surgeon, etc.). This is managed by system administrators 
when the account is setup and is maintained at a high level of stability.  
Thus, a user’s overall privileges will be the sum of the user’s access privileges in 
all tasks that user is involved in (being a policy), each of which is decided by the 
particular cases he/she can operate as a workgroup member to deliver healthcare ser-
vice (being a fact upon interaction instantiation) at the time of performing tasks, 
which in turn will be constrained by the accessible case partitions as determined by 
user professional roles (being a fact). 
User Privileges = ∑ (Interaction Model Set as determined by job level * Interaction Model’s Operational 
Cases as determined by job boundary * Case Subset as determined by job nature) 
Alternatively, the following meta-rule determines the prerequisite a user exercises 
privileges: a user has a title above the one required for running an interaction model 
can load a case, that is under the care of a workgroup which the user is a member of, 
and perform operations on the case parts the user’s specialists allow. 
user_privilege (user, im, case, part, operation) Å  
job_title(user, title1) & executable(title2, im) & above(title1, title2) & 
member(user, workgroup) & responsible(workgroup, patient) & own(patient, case) &  
job_specialist(user, specialist) & rights(specialist, part, op)  
5   Secure Interaction Models for Healthagents: A Comprehensive 
Case Study 
In this section, we describe our HealthAgents system, the elicitation of interaction 
models, and their secure running in our layered security model for HealthAgents.  
5.1   The HealthAgents Architecture  
The HealthAgents [18] system is a distributed decision support system that facilitates 
diagnosis and prognosis, employs a set of distributed nodes that either store patient 
case data, build classifiers that are trained upon case data and capable of classifying 
tumour types, or use classifiers for the diagnosis and prognosis of brain tumours. The 
magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) data used by the system is built up using 
anonymous information from child and adult cases. Producer nodes receive requests 
from clinicians and generate classifiers for particular tumours. Clinicians with cases 
will employ classifiers (instead of the actual cases) to assist in the diagnosis of   
patients for particular tumours. Knowledge extracted from cases is implicitly involved 
for decision making and patient privacy not compromised, private case information 
not being revealed in the process. The HealthAgents system consists of a variety of 
agents each charged with a different task. A more detailed description of the 
HealthAgents components and architecture can be found in [19]. 174  L. Xiao, P. Lewis, and S. Dasmahapatra 
 
Fig. 1. The HealthAgents system architecture and resource access flow control 
5.2   Building an Interaction Model Hierarchy with a Goal-Decomposition Graph 
Four major interaction models, as shown in Figure 2, are identified: create classifier, 
execute existing classifier, update classifier reputation value, and update case profile. 
They are elaborated as four sub-goals under the root goal of “tumour type diagnosis”  
via a goal decomposition graph, useful for requirements analysis and interaction model 
identification. A detailed goal decomposition procedure and underpinning process   
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Table 1. A high level view of selected interaction models 
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elicitation can be found in [24]. Table 1 describes a specific branch of the graph 
(“Update case profile”) for further discussion.  
5.3   Secure Interaction Models and Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) 
Assume three job titles, senior clinician, principal clinician, and junior clinician, in 
that order, forms the existing clinical hierarchy, from top to bottom. Roles in a role 
hierarchy of RBAC have inheritance relationships. Likewise, a job title higher up in 
the hierarchy inherits task execution privileges from a job title further down in the 
hierarchy. Suppose the following rules in HealthAgents restrict task availability. 
•  Rule1: Senior clinicians can identify the need of new classifiers in the network 
and so are able to create classifiers, using all public cases and local private cases. 
•  Rule2: Principal clinicians have primary healthcare responsibilities and so are 
able to run classifiers, update case profiles and diagnosis results, as well as up-
date classifier reputation values.  
•  Rule3: Junior clinicians assist in healthcare and can run classifiers and be advised 
of classification results.  
Gaia [3] unifies responsibilities and permissions in a single role notion. It is also 
recognised in [21] that the coordination among agents/roles and resources must enable 
authorisation policy specification over interaction specification to achieve an expres-
sive and safe interaction model. Thus, role, interaction, and constraint should be cor-
related. The descriptive interaction behaviour which consists of message passing and 
constraint solving have been defined in Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) 
[12] that can be transmitted, interpreted, and executed by agents in the network. The 
LCC language has been developed in the OpenKnowledge project [13] and it uses 
logic expression to regulate the message exchange protocols among participant peers 
each of which plays a particular role. The LCC language combines role functions and 
constraints in a single framework and this gives us the opportunity to express permis-
sion enforcement prior to responsibility fulfilment within role playing behaviour, in 
the context of running interaction protocols. The following LCC clauses describe the 
fundamental interaction pattern for resource access control. 
a(resource_request, RRID) :: 
  request(Resource, Operation, Context) ⇒ a(resource_manager, RMID)  
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  request(Resource, Operation, Context) ⇐ a(resource_request, RRID) ← grantPermission(RRID, Re-
source, Operation, Context, Policies) then ( 
    response(Grant_yes) ⇒ a(resource_request, RRID) or 
    response(Resource_result) ⇒ a(resource_request, RRID) ← getOperationResult(Resource, Operation, 
Access_result) ) 
Briefly, a(resource_request, RRID) :: DefRRID and a(resource_manager, RMID) :: 
DefRMID denotes that agents RRID and RMID play the roles of resource_request and 
resource_manager respectively as defined in the definitions follow. DefRRID has a 
single and DefRMID has a composite message passing behaviour constructed using the 
following forms: Defa then Defb (Defa satisfied before Defb), Defa or Defb (either Defa 
or Defb satisfied), or Defa par Defb (both Defa and Defb satisfied). In the Def, Ml ⇒ 
Am denotes that a message Ml is sent to agent Am while Ml ⇐ Am denotes that a mes-
sage Ml is received from agent Am. In the above role definitions, a message of re-
source access request is sent from the agent that plays the request role to the agent 
that plays the manager role. Upon receipt of this message, the resource manager agent 
applies appropriate security policies and responds by sending back a message either 
saying the request has been granted (or rejected) or by providing the actual resources 
(or the results of their usage) being requested. In the Def, ←Consn denotes that a 
constraint must be satisfied (as some running code) before the clause prior to it.  
The notion a(id, role) defines the role a certain agent should play and its identity 
can be bound with executable tasks, workgroup memberships, and professional spe-
cialists at runtime. The role playing behaviour defines the common responsibilities an 
entitled user supposed to fulfil, being in a position with/above a given title as are in 
Gaia, the organisational roles in well-defined positions associated with expected   
behaviour. Then the memberships and professional specialists further constrain the 
concrete resource usage in the role’s interaction model participation, being identity-
specific and role-independent. This layered architecture is discussed as follows, illus-
trated by a principal clinician updating case profile after classification.  
Level 1: Interaction Model constraints  
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The first layer filters interaction model availability. A principal clinician (possibly a 
GP) can load cases for which they have caring responsibilities and later update its 
profile (diagnosis result, etc.). A junior clinician can perform classification but cannot 
do the update. Figure 3 shows the interaction model and the following LCC clauses 
show its specification. The clinician plays a role of classification (R1) and updating 
case profile (R5). The role changes when an accurate diagnosis result is known.  
/* R1: classify a case */ 
a(clinician_classify, CID) :: 
  requestCaseRecordByID(I) ⇒ a(database, DBID) then 
  caseRecord (R) ⇐ a(database, DBID) then 
  requestClassification(R, C) ⇒ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then 
  classificationResults(S) ⇐ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then  
  a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
/* R5: update case record and classifier reputation following diagnosis */ 
a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) :: 
  ( updateCaseRecordByID(I) ⇒ a(database_update, DBID) then 
    caseRecordUpdated(Y) ⇐ a (database_update, DBID) )  
  par 
  ( updateClassifier(I) ⇒ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then 
    classifierUpdated(Y) ⇐ a (classifier_petitioner, CPID) ) 
Level 2: Case level constraints 
An interaction model is uniquely defined and its running context varies, e.g. involved 
clinicians and cases. A resource manager must check the request (resource and opera-
tion) against the requester identity at runtime, in compliance with the access policies. 
Specifically, the clinician must be a member of the workgroup delivering care to the 
owner of the case before the case is allowed to be updated, being a meta-rule of 
healthcare access control. Additional local policy rule satisfaction must also be con-
sidered for extra constraints, e.g. a particular clinician can/cannot access particular 
resource items. A generic security policy schema for healthcare is described in   
[25] that can complement the meta-rule with any number of specific policies.   
The following shows the LCC constraints used by the database agent, being a re-
source manager, for permission checking before the actual role functions are carried 
out. The database agent issues a case record (R2) and updates the same record (R6), 
different levels of permissions being needed.  
/* R2: send a case record for classification */ 
a(database_download, DBID) :: 
  requestCaseRecordByID(I) ⇐ a(clinician_classify, CID) ← grantPermission(CID, I, Read, Nor-
mal_classify_from_local_site, Local_database_read_policy_set) then 
  caseRecord(R) ⇒ a(clinician_classify, CID) ← getCaseRecordByID(I, R) then 
  a(database_update, DBID) 
/* R6: update a case record after classification */ 
a(database_update, DBID) :: 
  updateCaseRecordByID(I) ⇐ a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) ← grantPermission(CID, I, Update, 
Normal_update_from_local_site, Local_database_update_policy_set) then 
  caseRecordUpdated (Y) ⇒ a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
It is at the point of checking the LCC constraint of “grantPermission” that user work-
group and case will be related (clinician identity of CID and case identity of I), and other 
locally set read or update policies applied, prior to the required operation. A clinician not 
in the right workgroup may be able to download a case but cannot update it. The running 
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Level 3: Case partition constraints   
Similarly with level 2, a user identity is bound with professional specialists at runtime 
and this will constrain further permission to case partitions, e.g. only the named clini-
cians may update or write major diagnosis results; certain specialists may write re-
ports in their areas; others on the case care list may only read those areas. Thus, a 
three dimension resource request of (user, resource, operation) will be constrained in 
two dimensions: user-resource must match workgroup membership and user-
operation match job specialist.  
6   Conclusions and Discussion 
In this paper, we have analysed the general security requirements for clinical informa-
tion systems and developed a layered security model, illustrated by its application to 
the HealthAgents system but which is also applicable to other healthcare systems.  
Organisational structure and context association are key assumptions to our privi-
lege model. Organising authorisation at user level cannot realise cooperation and 
inter-organisational communication in extended health networks, as stated in [17]. 
The authors distinguish structural roles, describing prerequisites or competencies for 
actions and functional roles, being bound to the realisation of actions. Such a conjunc-
tional perspective of role is in accordance with the privilege control in business proc-
esses and then their contextual constraint. The semantic similarity of clinical user 
group privileges and the business processes they can perform is described in [11]. In 
addition to that, access decisions need to be made on the exercise of privileges in 
business processes depending upon contextual information. Structuring business 
process (or task) context related constraints, e.g. attending relation between physician 
and patient as well as clinician speciality, as contextual parameters to task execution 
that affect access control decisions is expressed in [20]. 
Clinical task execution privileges, therefore, should be distinguished, and repre-
sented by the privileges of running interaction models in our approach. The layered 
security model authorises at a higher level, the users’ task accessibility based on a 
static organisational structure and at a lower level, within task enactment, users’ case 
and case partition accessibility based on dynamic functional needs in order to perform 
tasks. This inevitably avoids the occasion that a junior clinician creates a classifier of 
poor quality or updates a classifier reputation value improperly.  
Next, higher level business function-based constraints are coupled with lower level 
data-based constraints. A limited set of data, determined by user workgroup member-
ships, will be allowed to be populated into the limited set of task functions. Finally, 
data-based constrains are additionally coupled with operation-based constraints. The 
available operations, determined by job nature and specialists, will be allowed, e.g. 
write (reports) or update (diagnosis results), upon particular data sections. These con-
straints, as well as individually defined local policies, must be satisfied prior to inter-
action model running. In sum, we constrain the availability of tasks to users, case 
availability to tasks, and further operations availability to cases, as the overall layered 
security architecture. The architecture is scalable since access rights are precisely 
controlled by the combination of these dimensions. For example, a senior pathologist 
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profile but someone who is a senior pathologist but not involved in caring for the 
patient cannot, or someone who is a junior doctor, or someone who is not specialised 
in pathology at all.  
No global user account repository is required in our system. The necessary interac-
tion models are globally agreed. The case to workgroup assignment is locally defined 
and user to workgroup possibly across organisations, for enabling interaction model 
running. When one user invokes an interaction model and this involves resources 
from other sites, the permission checking is determined by this user being involved in 
patient care or not, e.g. a remote clinician may perform a classification on behalf of a 
named doctor who is on holiday and delegates the responsibility to this clinician, in 
emergency situations, even the local hospital has not set up a local account for the 
clinician. 
Interaction models can be publicly accessible since the descriptive interaction logic 
among peers reveals no secret information itself and so no issue exists such as alterna-
tive interaction model provision to certain users under certain conditions. Rather, 
alternative resource peers may be selected because the access to others is restrictive 
or, a subset or related/alternative resource items from query returned to the requester 
peer with a limited set of privileges. Such an autonomic query relaxation paradigm, as 
part of our future work, will avoid additional user interaction and frustrating experi-
ence. Another direction of future work is via monitoring unsuccessful resource access, 
an interaction model adjustment is advised if an access without satisfying constraints 
is encountered but considered necessary. It may be useful to let such requests be re-
corded and routed to responsible doctors or other delegated authorisers who may or 
may not approve the issuing of additional privileges, either permanently or temporar-
ily. With better understanding of the necessity of such exceptional requests possibly 
after real life communication, critical and timely care aimed to patients will not be 
compromised.  
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